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So uth As ia
M A RC  G A B O R I E A U
There has been much speculation on the significance
of the Tablighi Jama’at, the workings of which re-
main secretive. The main controversy relates to its
stance on political matters. Since its foundation, it
has claimed to be completely aloof from politics.
However, doubts have been sporadically raised as to
the reality of this apolitical position, particularly in
Pakistan where some well-known members of the
movement were recently involved in the Afghan
problem and in internal politics.
Transnational Islamic
M o v e m e n t s :
Tablighi Jama’at
i n P o l i t i c s ?
Tablighi Jama’at, a transnational Muslim
proselytizing movement founded in India in
1927, has its headquarters in Nizamuddin, a
suburb of Delhi. From there it expanded
quietly all over the world from 1948 onward,
finally becoming conspicuous and influen-
tial by the end of the 1970s. It was founded
on six basic principles: the invitation (d a ’ w a,
or t a b l i g h) to Islam is not the affair of reli-
gious specialists, but the responsibility of all
Muslims who must devote their time and
money to it; one should not wait for people
to come to hear the preaching, but rather
preachers should travel to reach the people;
preaching is done by self-financing itinerant
groups; the mingling of all social classes is
obligatory within these groups; the primary
objective is to deepen the faith of those
who are already Muslims, proselytism to-
ward non-Muslims being marginal; and the
promotion of the unity of Muslims being a
primary objective, theological as well as po-
litical controversies are prohibited inside
the movement.
The secretive nature of the movement
makes it impossible to find direct evidence
of political strategies. There is nonetheless
an indirect means of doing so: reconsider-
ing its history, instead of focusing, as is usu-
ally done, on self-statements and on doctri-
nal literature, and trying to see if one can
read in this history indications of political in-
v o l v e m e n t .1 The historical literature con-
cerning Tablighi Jama’at is of two kinds, in-
ternal and external. From the founding of
the movement until 1965 – a time when the
movement was inconspicuous – the sources
are exclusively internal and consist in bio-
graphical (or rather hagiographical) litera-
ture in Urdu, mostly produced by an institu-
tion closely linked to the Tablighi Jama’at,
the Nadwatul-‘ulama. The literature is com-
prised of biographies of the founder,
Muhammad Ilyas Kandhalawi (1885-1944),
of his son and successor, Muhammad Yusuf
(1917-1965), and of their close associates,
particularly Muhammad Zakariyya (1898-
1982), who produced the edifying books
used in the movement under the collective
name The Teachings of Islam.2 For the period
after 1965, biographies are not available for
In’amul-Hasan, who ruled the movement
from 1965 to 1995. In’amul-Hasan died re-
cently and his biography has not yet come
out. However, the movement having be-
come by that time conspicuous, there are
external testimonies (unfortunately dis-
parate and not continuous) about its
spreading and workings. 
Origins and expansion
The first striking point of this history is
that the very foundation of the movement is
firmly rooted in politics. It emerged in the
decade of 1920-1930, which is crucial in In-
dian history: it witnessed a growing political
divergence of the Hindu and Muslim com-
munities, which ultimately led to the parti-
tion of the subcontinent between India and
Pakistan in 1947. This hostility was accom-
panied by fierce competition in proselytiz-
ing: Hindu revivalists of the Arya Samaj tried
to bring back Muslim descendants of con-
verts to their fold; and Muslims, in order to
win their backing and comfort the other
Muslims, created organizations for ‘preach-
ing’, a word which was rendered by the Ara-
bic term tabligh. All of these organizations
proved ephemeral, except the most recent-
ly created Tablighi Jama’at. One would be
tempted to say that it survived because it
was, unlike the others, apolitical. Upon clos-
er examination, however, politics always re-
mained in the background. It is not coinci-
dental that the only pamphlet that Muham-
mad IIyas ever wrote was addressed to the
politicians on the eve of partition. It would
therefore be more precise to say that – con-
trary to other Tabligh organizations – he
had a long-term political strategy which es-
chewed short-term political involvement,
and which ensured the durability of his
m o v e m e n t .
The world-wide expansion of the Tablighi
Jama’at was the main task of Muhammad
Ilyas’ son and successor, Muhammad Yusuf.
After the disturbances which followed the
Partition in 1947, he first consolidated the
movement all over the subcontinent. The
newly drawn border between India and Pak-
istan was ignored: as a transnational move-
ment, Tablighi Jama’at does not consider
borders to be significant. With this base
firmly established, Yusuf began to systemat-
ically extend his organization worldwide. He
established bridgeheads in the two areas
which he considered crucial for the world-
wide expansion of his movement (Arab
countries, from 1948 and Western countries
from 1950 onwards). Starting from 1956, he
established branches in the Afro-Asian
countries. Lately the movement has also
been active in China and Central Asia. In the
hagiography, this expansion is openly pre-
sented as a planned conquest of the world
in a wording and spirit reminiscent of the
medieval holy war or j i h a d: Tablighi Jama’at
is presented as a militant movement which
organizes people quasi militarily. It is able to
mobilize millions of people over the five
continents, as one can observe in the annu-
al meetings called i j t i m a’ or on special occa-
sions such as the funeral of In’amul Hasan in
Delhi in 1995. It evidently aims to build on
Muslim solidarity across borders, ignoring
the nation-states.
Tight organization
Tablighi Jama’at has a considerable hold
on those who enter its fold. It has remained
from the beginning very centralized: the
leadership has been jealously kept by the
lineage of the founder, with a Centre
( m a r k a z ) at Nizamuddin, from which author-
ity is delegated to chiefs (a m i r) in the coun-
tries, provinces, districts and towns. Local
leaders from all over the world come regu-
larly to the Centre for training. Members
who want to remain or even rise in the
movement must prove their commitment,
showing that they are not reluctant to
spend their own time and money for it. They
have to demonstrate the capacity to lead an
austere life according the model of the
Prophet and his Companions as described
in the edifying literature, which is circulated
and indefinitely commented upon at the
meetings. This hold on its members is so
complete that sociologist Felice Dasetto de-
scribed the movement as a ‘total institu-
tion’, and compared it to the ‘sects’ which
have multiplied in the contemporary world.
But to what end is this power? This is diffi-
cult to answer since the inner core of the
Tablighi Jama’at is not open to outsiders;
nor is it open to ordinary members who
have not risen in the hierarchy and pledged
their commitment. None of those having
reached this inner core have ever spoken.
Given its planned strategy of the conquest
of the world, which has been consistently
maintained, and the tight organization re-
maining in the hands of one lineage, it is dif-
ficult to believe that spiritual development
is the only aim. It would not be necessary to
keep such a tight grip on members if this
were the case. Given its secrecy, however,
its ultimate aim is difficult to discern.
Nonetheless, there are several indications,
especially in Pakistan and Bangladesh, that
Tablighi Jama’at is far from being indifferent
to politics. Prominent members have been
closely associated with the army and the in-
telligence service active in Afghanistan. The
president of Pakistan, Mohammad Rafiq
Tarar, is a Tablighi; he is believed to be the
main promoter of the new bill for the en-
forcement of the s h a r i ’ a. More generally, in
its origins and in its leadership, Tablighi Ja-
ma’at is closely linked with the Deobandi
school, which has always been highly politi-
cized and which currently backs the Taliban
movement in Afghanistan.
Although the final interpretation of the
significance of Tablighi Jama’at is not yet at
hand, scholars should not be too irenical
and manichaean, putting on one side purely
spiritual, peaceful and apolitical move-
ments (among which Tablighi Jama’at
would be the best example); and on the
other side the politically committed and
often violent Islamists which are represent-
ed, for example, in South Asia by the Ja-
ma’at-I Islami founded by Maududi (1903-
1 9 7 9 ) .
To my mind the dividing line is not be-
tween apolitical and political movements; it
is between two ways of conceiving politics.
On the one hand, with the Islamists, we
have a short-sighted conception of politics
in the framework of the nation-states, which
aims at conquering power by the shortest
route. On the other hand, with other schools
like the Tablighis and the Deobandis, there
is a far-sighted conception of politics. Going
beyond the narrow borders of nation-states,
they have not set fixed short-term ends.
Putting politics most often in parentheses,
they first build individuals and institutions,
which over time may exert a more lasting
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